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     Perhaps one of the most intriguing items for the new study of consciousness 
to consider is what, so far, appears not to have been considered. Why is this bur-
geoning interdisciplinary area of research, intent on discovering the relation of the 
brain to human awareness, not multidisciplinary enough? Or, to state the question 
another way, what light might a humanities-based imagist shed on the binding 
problem perplexing analytical philosphers, cognitive scientists, computer program-
mers, neurophysiologists or neuroanatamists, linguists, and both "strong" and 
"weak" Al proponents? In this paper, I want to wrestle with two conundrums. The 
first was identified by Francis Crick (among others) as central to providing a sys-
tematic account of higher-order consciousness. He spoke of the enigma of how dif-
ferent stimuli to different portions of the brain become married, as if by enchant-
ment, to produce a single, unified somatic experience of an object within an exis-
tential subject. The second puzzle emerges from problems of assessing the role 
played by qualia in determining a sense of self. 
     Briefly, I want to recuperate the sophisticated workings of analogy as a cross-
cortical model for mental combination, for the fitting of bits and pieces of experi-
ence together. In this postmodern age of difference, the subtle varieties of likeness 
and the delicate art of making connections bridging distant elements has been lost. 
The Cubist portait-still-lives of Braque, Gris, and Picasso, as Pierre Reverdy 
remarked, show how subjectivity exists in interaction with a world characterized by 
spatial flux not rigid geometries.' The enfolding of an inner self, the four walls of a 
room, and the outside world demonstrates the French poet's conviction that con-
sciousness comes into being just as objects come into being : because of their rela-
tions. Just as a mental and bodliy engagement moves detached things closer to one 
another, we become aware of awareness only in the drive toward attaining connect-
edness, during that expenditure of psychic and physical energy forcing disparate 
things to converge. The in-betweenness of assemblage, those body-object amalgams 
composed of tossed scraps and found objects, reveal the stunning spectrum of relo-
1. Jennifer Pap, "Entre quatre murs': Reverdy, Cubism, and the Space of Still Life," Word & Image. 12 (April-June 
  1996), 181.
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catable patterns available to human subjectivity. 
     Collage, as the process of transforming ephemera by cutting and pasting it 
into momentarily stable configurations, is, therefore, a particularly effective tech-
nique for capturing the chimera of consciousness in action. Originating with the 
Cubists and expanded by the Dadaists and Surrealists, this "gluing" of transitory 
detritus extends into montage, film editing and, now, computer manipulation. 
Compounding incongrous parts and provisionally joining farfetched elements in 
space and time break duality-establishing boundaries, whether in art or in science.' 
Like the cross-kingdom fusions fabricated by Berkeley's David Ow, welding togeth-
er the genetic substance of a firefly and tobacco to form phosphorescent plants, 
artits like Hannah Hoch merged, substituted, and mutated aspects of one species of 
imagery into another. 
     More recently, Suzanne Anker's installation piece, Zoosemiotics (1993), used a 
large glass vessel filled with water set in the middle of a room to magnify silvery 
sculptural simulations of anumal chromosomes distributed on the wall in random, 
mostly circular order. The abstract mirroring performed by the beaker selectively 
coalesced the X-shape of the chromosomes (found in one specific cell), changing 
them into miniature bodies dancing on the curved sides of the globe and swimming 
within the transparent liquid. This optical compression, anthropomorphization, 
and transformation of linguistic grids and codes into cavorting figures offers a strik-
ing parallel to the selective fashioning of graffiti-like experience into a coherent self 
by the mind. Similarly, in Orshi Drozdik's process piece, Ervthrocvtes (1988), the 
stationing of a convex lens mounted on a rod and sied in front of a sea of sculp-
tured cells invites individual viewers to unify, personalize, and internalize an anony-
mous body's microphenomena. I am suggesting, then, that the brain's "binding" 
capacity, no less than gene splicing or blood chemistry, can be externalized for 
scrutiny precisely in those aesthetic situations when it abruptly juxtaposes or tightly 
links variegated experiences. 
    Crick's formulation of the "binding problem" restates the great epistemologi-
cal riddle of abstraction. Here, I must venture into a short excursus. In the second 
chapter of Body Criticism, called "Abstracting," argued that there were two major 
strands of cognitive compression or selective epitomization running through west-
ern thought : one, a purist, minimalist, so-to-speak Mies van der Rohean "mod-
ernist" view, that saw the mind as dissecting sensations to arrive at a geometric 
Absolute ; and a second, prismatic, synthetic, Frank Gehryean, if you will, "post-
modernist" view, that envisioned the mind stitching chaotic appearances together, 
placing novel findings in contact with existung knowledge so that the old is simul-
2. Suzanne Anker, Gene Culture : Molecular Metaphor in Visual Art. exh. cat.(New York : Plaza Gallerv, 1994), p.2.
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taneously constructed and deconstructed by the new. It may help to imagine such 
mental sorting and combining of contrary visual information as a process akin to 
Henry James' differential refraction of uniquely marred personnae through the 
translucent sides of a golden bowl. That beautiful, but subtly cracked, crystal goblet 
served the novelist as a single, but shattering, fooalizing object capable of revealing 
his motley characters' more or less flawed temperaments, their healthy or unhealthy 
consciousness. This Janus-face of abstraction-as both quintessence and chromatics-
captures the brain's preferential mechanism in action, able to eliminate some neu-
ronal groups while stengthening others and so allowing us to learn over time. 
     Box art (from Marcel Duchamp's Boite-en-Valise to Lucas Samaras' glass, fur, 
or needle-lined coffers and comoartments), represents an intensification of collage 
practices. It, too, divides all physical existence into the hard-edged container and 
the always-escaping stream of the contained.' Resembling the brain in the fact that 
an amazing, even paradoxical, variety of things can be stored, conserved, memorial-
ized, but, above all, gathered and transmuted within its confines, the box is the 
epitome of a malleable universe finely adjusted to the contradictory emotions of its 
owner. 
     The enigmatic vitrine constructions of Joseph Cornell, in particular, capture 
the dream-like nature of human consciousness : ever present and ever in the past. In 
Cornell's phrase, these "toys for mathematicians" enshrining different levels of 
imagery, precipitate mental voyages flowing backward and forward in time and 
across space. At once deeply personal to the artist, these haunting environments also 
touch museum goers by provoking a flow of explicit and implicit memories.' 
Indifferent or fleeting cast-offs-like vanishing sensations-are alchemically metamor-
phosed into cherished, enduring objects for every man and woman. These perish-
ables preserved within a sheltering receptacle do for vision what the madeleine did 
for fragrance. We become aware of a transparent wine glass, an agate marble, a 
Victorian doll, a sky chart, or the blued-over engraving of a Medici portait before 
we think it. One can say of these volatile, qualia-ladened reliquaries what Proust 
claimed for his tea-steeped biscuit : "But when from a long-distant past nothing 
subsists still the smell and taste of things remain poised a long time, ready to 
remind us in the tiny and almost impalpable drop of their essence, of the vast stru-
ture of recollection." 
    The olfactory epithelium and the limbic system, that oldest part of the brain 
from an evolutionary standpoint, remind us that receptor cells fire messages which, 
in turn, transmit signals flooding us with love, desire, sorrow, joy, and rare. The
3. Walter Hopps, "Boxes," Art International. 6111/2 (March 20, 1964), 38. 
4. Daniel Schacter, Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind and the Past (New York : Basic Books, 1996).
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confounding ways in which scents, savors, sights, and sounds manage, in Kipling's 
words, to make our "heart-strings crack," raises the other pressing question the new 
mind researchers, no matter their camp, agree requires resolution. How does the 
brain produce a cohesive consciousness from physical substances that waft, caress, 
vacillate, shimmer, or drift outside of us and yet touch and alter us internally? A 
key, and much-disputed, factor in the process of cognitive binding is precisely the 
mysterious role played by qualia. 
     No one demonstrated better than Joseph Cornell that molding the welter of 
the passions into manifestly organized compositions is one of the greatest and most 
haunting achievements of the visual arts. In Taglioni's Jewel Casket (1940), he creat-
ed a blue velvet-lined wooden box which ceremonially presents a crystal necklace 
elegantly draped above a rising tide of glass cubes. One of a series of Homages to 
the Romantic Ballet, it bears an inscription in Cornell's hand affixed to the inside 
lid. \"On a moonlit night in the winter of 1835 the carriage of Marie Taglioni was 
halted by a Russian highway man, and that enchanting creature commanded to 
dance for this audience of one on a panther's skin spread over the snow beneath the 
stars. From this actuality arose the legennd that to keep alive the memory of this 
adventure so precious to her, Taglioni formed the habit of placing a piece of artifi-
cial ice in her jewel casket or dressing table where, melting among the sparking 
stones, there was evoked a hint of the atmosphere of the starlit heavens over the ice-
coverd landscape." 5 
    By giving palpable shape to intense emotions, Cornell unforgettably turned 
indescribable intimacies into publicly shareable analogies. This age-old search for 
material equivalences to match the qualitative feel of elusive inner states fueled the 
pursuit of color correspondences (a peculiarly Romantic quest engaging Goethe to 
Delacroix). It continues to drive research into how people are affected by distinctive 
odors (an old question, underlying the development of the perfumer's blending 
skill as well as early-modern medical therapies directed against airborne contagion). 
It remains evident in the desire to find visual or verbal parallels for the gamut of 
tactile pressures the body can undergo (think of Diderot's struggle to inventory 
Chardin's veiling glazes and textured strokes or the Marquis de Sade's encyclopedic 
itemization of erotic palpations). And it lives on when we try to articulate the gusta-
tory pleasures (famousy classified by Brillat-Savarin) arising from rolling delicious 
flavors around the tongue and over the palate. 
    Historically, such hard-to-systematize sensations posed, and continue to pose, 
a major difficulty for many scientists and philosophers : spanning Isaac Newton, the
5. Alex Mogelon and Norman Laliberte, Art in Boxes (New York, Cincinnati, Toronto, London, Melbourne : Van 
  Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1974), p.84.
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British empiricists, up to and including Gerald Edelman. Presumably, since no two 
people experience these secondary qualities or characteristics (as Shaftesbury 
notably termed them) exactly alike, how do such variable subjective conditions fit 
into a general theory of consciousness? This isomorphist quandary-taking similarity 
to mean exact copy (and fere, I think, an art historical perspective on the range of 
gradations possible between an original and a replica is especially pertinent) -has 
led Daniel Dennett, for one, to deny the existence of inner mental states altogether. 
His is a slightly softer version of Paul and Patricia Churchland's robotic model of 
the brain as computer or information processor, a position that reduces that organ 
to rapid-fire neuronal operations performed in parallel. Ironically, in spite of the 
reliance by numerous brain researchers on conspicuous connective metaphors such 
as "nets" and "maps" to describe perceptual categorization this computational theo-
ry does not satisfactorily explain how vision, anatomical structure, the nervous sys-
tem, and a shifting external milieu interact to form a sustaining and sustained psy-
chic architecture that is also fluidly developmental. 
    Modern philosphy from Descartes forward has quantified certainty, that dis-
cusive activity of mathematics asserting that nothing has been introduced by the 
actual operation of the intellect that it cannot fully identify. In other words, the 
claim is that nothing is being added or subtracted, equated or changed without the 
mind's active warrant that no mistake either has occurred or is possible. To ensure 
the maintenance of exact identity, mathematical vigiance of this sort admits only a 
small set of valid transformations. Discursive certainty, as opposed to the propor-
tional adjustments typical of analogy, is a matter of atating specifically how things 
are staying the same and precisely how they are being altered.' The Cartesian legacy 
to the computational philosophy of mind, I believe, is thus two-fold. First, it always 
raises doubts in the face of ambiguity, i.e., when things are not clear and distinct. 
This wariness, together with the application of an anatomizing method, continues 
even, when by their very nature (like synaesthetic qualia), the phenomena in ques-
tion cannot be clear and distinct both because they are nuanced and because they 
permeate one another. Second, a debilitating Pyrrhonian skepticism accompanies 
the realization that the contents of the mind have somehow become transformed 
and that this shift cannot be completely identified and wholly articulated through 
measurement. To obviate the resulting corrosive doubt, the measurements became 
so fine-grained that they "nanotechnologize" the phenomena observed, dissecting 
complex, engulfing experiences into fragmented microminiatures. 
     I offer as a counter- example to such militant quantitative rationalism the
6. Carl Page, "Symbolic Mathematics and the Intellect Militant : Modern Philosophy's Revolutionary," Journal of the 
  History of Ideas. 57 (April 1996), p..238.
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recent work of Bill Viola. One of the leading artists working in video and sound 
installations, he uses innovative multimedia technologies to explore sense percep-
tion as an avenue to embodied self-awareness. Cerated in 1994, Stations comprises 
five channels of video projection accompanied by strangely unnerving underwater 
sounds. Five cloth screens are suspended from the ceilling of the unlit gallery. Lage 
slabs of polished black granite are placed flat on the floor touching the screens. Five 
gently swaying figures, submerged head downward, have their vertical reflections 
individually righted on the highly polished, tombstone-like horizontal surfaces. At 
random intervals, the projected bodies glide out of the frame leaving the vacated 
space shadowy and silent. Suddenly the male and female figures take turns in 
plunging back into view with a brilliant splash of noise and flare of light that 
momentarily blazes in the gloom. 
     In describing Stations, the artist commented that "an initial surface appear-
abce of eerie, serene beauty resides over a deeper disturbing aspect of muted vio-
lence and disorder, with the disrooted, isolated, free-floatingbodies evoking an eter-
nal state between dream and death."' In an earlier piece, Reflecting Pool (1977-
1980), various figures were not drowned, but hovered, in mid-air above the concen-
tric ripples of a deep, mirroring spring concealed within a lush forest. Like the mag-
ical artifacts trapped within Cornell's nocturnal boxes, Viola's tranquil or agitated 
dark water contemplatively envelops the beholder, drawing her experientially down-
ward into the normally unseen well of consciousness. Significantly, video plastically 
models mutable and nebulous sensations in a way that Artificial Intelligence sys-
tems or smart machines do not. As a "softer," unfurling technology, it constitutes a 
participatory medium coterminous with our own dissolving imaginings, wants, sen-
sations of mortality and eternity. The monumental scale, wavy motion, and ele-
mental rhythm of Station's nudes-spanning youth to age-fuse in uncanny synchro-
nization with the growth, change, and endings of the viewer's inner life. 
    Not just the present but the past also offers an untapped repetory of sophisti-
cated imaging strategies demonstrating the complexities of physically, mentally, 
emotionally, and spiritually connecting as we dive beneath our own and other's sur-
faces. This topic, as far as I can tell. remains largely unaddressed in the social scien-
tific and scientific literature on consciousness with the exception of Lakoff and 
Johnson's richly suggestive work on categorization and metaphor. A fuller under-
standing of art's ability to create harmony out of lofe's discontinuities would help 
to account for those as yet non-computed characteristics of the mind : namely, how 
it is able to bring distant things into contiguity and the mutuality, not identity, of 
human feelings.
7. Bill Viola. Stations (1994), exh. handout (Los Angeles : Lannan Foundation, 10 July to 22 December, 1996).
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     I want to add three further reflections to current discussions about the new 
mind. First consciousness appears to be inherently visual. Fundamentally about rep-
resentation, it involves developing a visualizable self-image over time, permitting us 
to see ourselves as both standing apart from and inside our surroundings. The 
coherence associated with self-awareness-lasting for longer or shorter periods-
becomes evident not so much by invoking the Cartesian language of automata, pul-
leys, and now wiring, transistors, and software, but in the production of fugitive or 
lasting patterns of relations. In that sense, consciousness becomes real only insofar 
as consciousness is desired. The practical production of a unified and graspable dis-
play of self results from the selective correlation of many different representations 
distributed over wide-spread areas of the brain. 
    Appositely, this palpably connective neurological language has a symbolic 
counterpart in the talismanic thaumaturgy used by Greco-Egyptian temple priests 
to invoke the ineffable oneness of the divine presence through a divisible material 
object. What might appear an improbable comparison, in reality, embeds the enig-
ma of not-so cerebral bonding within a Darwinian competitive universe of animal 
appetites and the carnal biology of natural selection. Simultaneously, the startling 
correlations made by the "new mind" can also be situated within an ancient procre-
ative and sexualized system of divination, of antithetical powers and reproductive 
potencies springing from physical attraction. 
     I am conjuring up the neoplatonic and gnostic cosmos of magical correspon-
dences, the oracular realm of spellbinding sympathies in which all things possess 
vertical and horizontal linkages arcing across the three kingdoms of nature. 
Synesius, Iamblichus, Proclus, and much of the late Roman world also looked for 
visible portents connecting the corporeal to the incorporeal domain. Mediating 
omens were thought to bring about liaisons between tangible objects-stone, a gem, 
a piece of bone-and a higher, intangible psychic dimension. Not surprisingly, since 
there is something mysterious about the art of healing. The alliance between magic 
and medicine has a long history in the West. During the Renaissance, Marsilio 
Ficino's (1433-1499) translation of the just-discovered Corpus Hermeticum, as well 
as works by Plotinus, propagated the view that the wise physician could control dis-
ease by directing astral influences into the sick body.' 
    Talismans, amulets, charms enhanced his receptivity of planetary influences 
and so helped uncover elaborate sympathies existing between the terrestial and 
celestial zones. This interconnected universe of correspondences remained in place 
until severely compromised by the derision of the Enlightenment. Jaucourt, in his
8. Martha Baldwin, "Abracadabra or Magic in Medicine," in Abracadara: The Magic of Medicine. exh. cat.(London 
   Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine, 1996), pp. 12-13.
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medical articles written for Diderot's and D'Alembert's Encyclopedie, mocked the 
doctrine of pictorial signatures and its attendant belief in the binding capacity of 
incantatory artifacts joining the greater and lesser worlds, the exterior and the inte-
rior realms. 
    While easy to ridicule from a rationalist standpoint, the theory of sympathies 
and antipathies was fundamentally concerned to explain how dramatically different 
sensory phenomena could be collected, recollected, and internalized as part of one's 
own noetic substance. Finding or inventing a similar kinship between visible sign 
and invisible or remote meaning determined the abrupt juxtapositions typical of a 
Baroque cabinet of curiosities, the segmented, miniature-lined compartments of a 
Ching dynasty treasure chest, and the imaginative leaps from the ordinary to the 
extraordinary elicited by a Joseph Cornell cosmological box. Paradoxically, it also 
characterizes the computationalists' identification (not approximating resemblance) 
of brain with consciousness, their desire for a direct, unmediated link between an 
originating material organ and the epiphanic presence of an elusive, singular aware-
ness. 
    This brings me to my second point. It seems more fruitful to situate the 
binding problem within the context of philosophical and rhetorical analogy than 
quantitative certainty. Alternately praised or vilified from Plato, to Aquinas, to Mill, 
and Wittgenstein, analogy seems a more apt concept for getting at the complexly 
designed ways in which first-person phenomena hang together that the computer-
derived "interface." The fashionability of the latter term already presupposes that 
the brain functions like a special sort of apparatus. An interface has been defined as 
"the collection of components which connects the analogue and digital computers 
to each other and controls and converts the data." As early as 1837, however, the 
adjective "interfacial" emerged in crystallography texts to describe the surface ener-
gy, tension, polarization, and absorption occurring between two faces of a crystal.' 
One may well ask, What is the appropriateness for brain research of importing a 
word, alluding either to the intercommunication between two or more pieces of 
dead equipment or between the several planes of inert minerals, into its organic 
precincts? Video plastically models mutable and nebulous primal sensations in a 
way that Artificial Intelligence systems or smart machines do not. As a "softer," 
unfurling technology, it constitutes a participatory medium that intersects with our 
own dissolving imaginings, wants, sensations of mortality and eternity. The monu-
mental scale, undulating motion, and elemental rhythm of Station's nudes-span-
ning youth to age-fuse in uncanny synchronization with the ebbings and eddyings 
of the beholder's inner life.
9. Ivan Illich, "Guarding the Eye in the Age of Show," Pes, 23 (Autumn 1995), 47.
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     Not just the present but the past, too, offers an untapped repetory of sophis-
ticated imaging strategies demonstrating the complexities of physically, mentally, 
emotionally, and spiritually connecting as we rise or sink beneath our own and 
other's surfaces. Image-schemas or Gestalts, according to George Lakoff, transcend 
the mere collection of their disparate parts. These structured wholes-like Viola's 
holistic installation pieces which are the joint products of the artist's and beholder's 
active configuration-arise from the fitting of a passing sensation to a categorizable 
representation." A fuller understanding of art's perennial capacity to create junc-
tures between automatic, unconscious perceptions and conscious thought could 
help account for the as yet non-computed subjective characteristics of the mind. a 
creative function akin to sexual reproduction in that a third, new and unifying indi-
vidual arises from two distinct and separate beings. Ironically, then, this supposedly 
outmoded realm of corporeally-conceived liaisons in more biologically up-to-date 
that the current model of awareness that has it resulting from the asexual merger of 
cybernetic hardware. The joining of differences by discovering or generating simi-
larities-whether at the macro-or micro-level-even coincides better with the funda-
mental premise of evolutionary theory that the earth's species, includibg Homo 
sapiens, arose through divergence from a common ancestor. Darwin's explanation 
that diversity was wrought by natural selection over millions of years is based not 
only on a principle for separating, but for assimilating very different kinds of organ-
isms. 
       This emergent dimension of analogy prevents the "new mind" from being 
absolutely severed from the "old mind." Specifically, it succeeds in illuminating 
John Searle's view of sentience as a set of intricate interlocking sensations that 
almost pragmatically arise in the brain in response to the interactions of its many 
parts. It also lends support to Roger Penrose's thesis that our understanding exceeds 
any computer because a computer only uses algorithms (that is, sets of precise rules 
that specify a sequence of actions to be taken in order to solve a problem or prove a 
proposition). This position has been much attacked because, it is argued, computa-
tional cognitive science does not require that people comprehend the lengthy and 
incredibly complicated programs employed to solve cognitive problems. But the 
issue (and here I also differ with Penrose) is not whether we do or do not under-
stand the rules we use to arrive at mathematical (his example) or other conclusions 
but, rather, how we can be made to see or become aware of the somatic operations 
we undergo while we are in the process of experiencing them. As I have been sug-
10. Elizabeth Legge, "Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Virgin : Frandis Picabia's La Sainte Vierge," Word & Image, 12 
  (April-June, 1996), 227. Also sec excellent essay on early wentieth-century gendering of machines by Caroline A. 
  Jones,"The Sex of the Machine : Mechanized Bodies in Early Modernism," from the conference Histories of 
  Science/Histories of Art, Session on The Body (November 4, 1995).
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gesting, making these intricate and intuitive procedures visible constitutes the entire 
history of art. Moreover, by taking us back up the Darwinian ladder of evolution to 
the associative origins of human thought, analogy offers a non-algorithmic tech-
nique for binding the known to the unknown, expressed in terms of similarities and 
antitheses. Learning, in this developmental scheme, does not arise from a chain of 
reasoning but from a dynamic back and forth motion among choices that embrace 
the enitire universe in their scope. 
    The limitations of algorithms for ascertaining what and how we know leads 
to my third point, also concerning the operations of analogy and its pertinence for 
understanding brain functioning. It remains questionable whether scientists can 
simulate on computers, the way they simulate tornados, the suppleness of encom-
passing cognitive processes. Indeed, is the machine-ideal of replication, copy, and 
digital reproduction adequate for the mystery of self-imaging that goes on inside us? 
The joining impulses of analogy, on the other hand, enact in another medium and 
in an external space, those leaps and springs of the mind that elude computational 
modelling yet lie at the heart of human awareness. According to the analogical sys-
tem, the mind acts like spreading fingers grasping and sweeping together various 
things. The aesthetic counterpart to this tangible reaching for affinities, while 
acknowledging divergences, is verisimilar illusion. Unlike the manufacture of delu-
sively exact simulations, viewer-adjusted illusion arises from the painter's skill in 
juxtaposing the chromatic manifold. Seen from a specific vantage point or from a 
particular perspective, such approximating compositions momentarily persuade the 
beholder that different sorts of phenomena can physically coexist within an imagi-
native or mentalized realm. 
     Baroque poetics-steeped in the neoplatonic and gnostic doctrine of emana-
tions, founded on a graduated descent from the macrocosm to the microcosm and 
sloping uninterruptedly downward from the One to the many-is characterized by 
just such a search for vertical and horizontal junctures suturing all portions of the 
cosmos. It is the Piranesian capriccio predicated on analogy, therefore, which 
most nearly resembles the unpredictable, stag-like jumps of neurons, leaping along 
global reentry pathways, darting in and out of memory, fleeing towards and away 
from categories. 
     Most recently, Umberto Eco satirized the early- modern "excess of wonder" 
that led an Agrippa of Nettesheim or an Athanasius Kircher into engaging in mani-
acal processes of Hermetic semiosis encouraging any similarity to be exploited." But 
unlike the interpretive extremes typical of postmodern deconstructionism, the clas-
sical theory of analogy does not claim that, for the healthy mind, everything means
11. Umberto Eco, The Limits of Interpretation (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1995).
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almost anything or necessarily possesses a similarity to everything else. Besides, and 
contra Eco, analogy has something specific to add to the electronic computing rev-
olution and to the so-called death of linear thinking." The computer's non-sequen-
tial capacity to arrange data first in this way, and then in that, has an important pre-
cursor in Leibniz's ars combinatoria. This hieroglyphics of manipulatable characters 
was simultaneously an analogical method for spurring mental invention and a par-
allel processing model of abstracting powers of intelligence demonstrating that 
human beings can think about more than one thing at a time. 
    To conclude : my point has been two-fold. Historical examples showing the 
brain at work practically instantiate both the durable and mutable processes of 
human cognition in ways that the new computational philosophy of consciousness-
couched in terms of classifier systems, algorithms, and neural networks-has ren-
dered opaque to ordinary comprehension. More significantly, these elaborate com-
positions also reveal what the computer cannot, that is, the ongoing ritual of con-
scious and unconscious elaboration itself. Thus a Baroque cabinet of curiosities, like 
an English landscape garden, is not merely a secret museum and an idiosyncratic 
receptacle for seducing a private audience, but its sensory array of precious frag-
ments, freestanding ruins, ceremonial devices, and cult artifacts concretely enacts 
the juxtapositive impulses of the intellect. While forging liks always occurs within a 
given cultural milieu, it also transcends the limits of any particular environment to 
exhibit the designs by which the mind generally creates affinities. I have been 
proposing uses for the past, then so that people will not blindly trust hidden or 
automated manoeuvers they cannot possibly understand without the assistance of a 
commonsense analogy linking neurophysiology to life situations. 
    Far from positing an indeterminate and limitless relativism, appropriate anal-
ogy encourages us to accept the fit between two disparate things only if the second 
thing follows from the first based on prior experience. By establishing geometrical 
relations of proportionality, equivalency, and nuanced degrees of resemblance 
among heterogeneous objects, it permits the comparability of not just individual, 
but of human, patterns of awareness and action. Instead of insisting on a literal iso-
morphism between the brain's nanoprocesses and anatomized qualia-which does 
not do justice to the larger, holistic intertwisting of ideas with affect-analogy places 
these unlike phenomena (receptor cells and felt experiences) into relation. As cur-
rently defined, the heart of the problem of consciousness lies in the flagrant contrast 
or clash between organ and awareness. How does one satisfactorily reconcile the 
paradox of a disembodied brain as scientific instrument and conglomerate of dis-
sected processes with the everyday ambiguities, unfixed meanings, enchaining and
12. James Bailey, After Thought. The Computer Challenge to Intelligence (New York : Basic Books, 1996).
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mingling of displacements, transformations, compressions, and hidden affinities we 
somatically experience as sentience? 
     Art, I have been suggesting, assists in locating a point of contact between a 
juxtapositive mass of precisely firing neurons and our cloudy inner atmosphere. It 
pictures both the hardwiring in compositional action as well as the perplexing 
weather within, enabling us to visually analogize a concordance between matter and 
thought. Every work of art consists of parts that are modified or even inverted by 
the context into which they are placed. Collage, assemblage, and grotesques, espe-
cially, display contradictions in a kind of double exposure on their surfaces forcing 
us to see the arbitrariness of the copula and the magnitude of the required reconcili-
ation. Revitalizing forgotten, or if remembered, despised analogy, then, might help 
us discover not only how the mind seeks out and connects linear with non-linear 
arrangements, or manages to synthesize the vast quantities of data with which we 
are increasingly inundated but how, time and again, it binds our shifting, com-
pound selves into a single self in moments of consciousness.
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